Will retail eat our online sales?

Retail didn’t eat online sales at any of five brands that made the move. It took margin. We traced five direct-to-consumer brands that scaled into retail through the public record, set the brand’s own public numbers against them, and sourced every number.

  1. Market report · A skincare brand moving into retail01 / 06

    The question

    Will retail eat online sales?

    Five brands that moved from selling online to thousands of stores. What happened to their own sites, and what the media did.

  2. Market report · A skincare brand moving into retail02 / 06

    What happened

    Retail didn’t eat online at any of the five.

    The share shifted; the online business grew. The cannibalization that is real is margin: the retailer’s cut, trade spend and fees. Not demand.

  3. Market report · A skincare brand moving into retail03 / 06

    Why

    The two channels fed each other.

    A store opening lifts online sales nearby by 6.9%, and 13.9% for direct-to-consumer brands, according to industry research across $848 billion of transactions.

  4. Market report · A skincare brand moving into retail04 / 06

    What the media did

    Media pointed at one shelf, in one week.

    The launches that worked sent people to a named store in its launch week, then reported that store’s sales, not impressions.

  5. Market report · A skincare brand moving into retail05 / 06

    What to do

    • PointLaunch media at one retailer’s shelf in its set week.
    • FundRetail media from the trade budget, for position.
    • ProtectGive the site a job the shelf can’t do.
    • ReportThe four numbers buyers manage to.
  6. That’s the answer06 / 06

    What’s your question?

Why they asked.

A skincare brand that started online was moving deeper into retail and needed a media plan for the next phase. Before anyone briefed an agency, the team wanted to know what had happened to other brands that made the same move.

The worry in the room was cannibalization: every shopper who found the brand on a shelf might be a shopper the website lost. The team also needed to know what kind of media had sold product off a retailer’s shelf, and which numbers the retail buyer would use to judge it.

It mattered because the answer moves money: launch media, retail media networks, the job of the brand’s own site, and what gets reported back to buyers at the next line review.

How we answered it.

Their own data

The brand’s own question and its plan for moving from selling online into retail.

What people say and do

What five brands that made the same move actually saw, from filings, trade press, retailer media and marketplace listings: 157 sources.

  1. Pick five brands that made the move

    We chose five brands that went from selling online to thousands of stores and left a public trail: Hero, Bubble, Harry’s, Liquid Death and Poppi. Two are in skincare, one in shaving and two in drinks, so the pattern had to hold across categories.

  2. Source every number

    Every number came from company filings and interviews, trade press, retail media networks and marketplace listings. The series rests on a 157-source ledger, and 14 source slides show the page behind each number, captured on one date.

  3. Trace what happened to online sales

    For each brand we traced what happened to its own site and its Amazon business as retail scaled, and where margin went. We looked for cannibalization of demand and cannibalization of margin separately.

  4. Trace what the media did

    For each retail launch we traced what the media pointed at, when it ran, and what got reported afterward. The pattern across five brands became five moves for the media plan.

  5. Read the client’s starting point

    We set the client’s public numbers against the five: doors, revenue per door, prices by channel, and which of the numbers a buyer manages to were not public.

Everything we found.

0 of 5

Retail didn’t eat online sales at any of the five

Hero still got most of its revenue from Amazon at its $630 million sale, and was first in its Amazon category in 2024. Bubble’s site became its community and launch channel at more than $100 million a year across 17,000-plus stores. Poppi was still the top-selling soft drink on Amazon past 30,000 stores. Liquid Death dropped its own fulfillment by choice and sent site shoppers to Amazon and retail, with $333 million of retail sales in 2024. The share shifted. The online business grew.

The cannibalization that is real is margin

What retail takes is margin: the retailer’s cut, trade spend, slotting fees and deductions. None of the five lost online demand to the shelf. A brand planning a retail push should model margin carefully and stop worrying that every shelf sale is a lost site sale.

13.9%

A store opening lifts online sales near it

Industry research from ICSC, across $848 billion of transactions, found a store opening lifts online sales in its trade area by 6.9%, and by 13.9% for direct-to-consumer brands. The two channels feed each other. A shelf is also an ad for the site.

Two thirds

The shelf reaches people the site never did

Two thirds of Harry’s early Target buyers had never bought a razor at Target. In its Target launch year Harry’s also added almost 500,000 subscribers at an 80% repeat rate, and Target.com sold the subscription, with 5% off for its store card holders. The shelf brought new buyers, and the subscription kept them.

7×

Media that sold off the shelf pointed at one fixture in one week

Hero’s TikTok videos named Target and asked customers to photograph the shelf, which “helped to double Hero’s sales goals at Target” at seven times the cost-efficiency of Instagram Stories; Target then expanded the range. Bubble put ambassadors’ faces on Walmart endcaps and ran a Snapchat filter and live TikTok in launch week. At Target it sent a 380,598-person list, with a 74% open rate, to one fixture in one week. The launches that worked reported that store’s sales afterward, not impressions.

824%

Retail media is bought for position

Hero’s Target attributed sales rose 824% ten months after joining the retailer’s ad network, per a vendor case study, and 247% across the newer retail media marketplaces, where the brand said it was “willing to accept a lower ROAS.” What these networks sell is rank in the retailer’s own search results and measurement against the retailer’s own transactions. Those attributed sales land in the buyer’s velocity dashboard, which is the number the buyer sees at the next review. The bases are large: more than 100 million Target Circle members, about 44 million Ulta members, more than 90 million CVS ExtraCare members, and Walmart’s online and in-store transactions.

$100,000

Amazon is the signal buyers read

Retailers “see Amazon success as validation.” Poppi’s founder posted one video about making “over $100,000 on Amazon while we were sleeping,” and the Amazon rank became a slide in its line reviews. TikTok carried most of Poppi’s paid media. A strong marketplace rank is evidence a buyer can use to say yes.

$12.99

One price everywhere, different counts by channel

Hero charges $12.99 for 36 patches on Amazon, its own site and every shelf, then varies the count: 72 on the site, 75 on Amazon. No channel is cheaper per pack, so no buyer asks for margin support against the brand’s own site. Bubble prices Walmart three cents under its site. Reviews travel too: Hero’s 36-count listing on Amazon carries 185,032 ratings and a Best Seller badge, which is what a buyer checks first.

4

The buyer judges the media by four numbers

ACV (how much of the retailer’s volume carries you), units per store per week against the category, household penetration and repeat. Doors are a count; the buyer manages to these. Harry’s had 10% of Target’s cartridge sales and about 50% of handles within four weeks, made that public within a month, and tripled sales and penetration by month eight. Those numbers sold Walmart. Poppi’s growth came from volume in existing stores, with repeat over 40%, and that growth is what PepsiCo paid $1.95 billion for.

Where the client started

The client already had more doors than one of the five had at its sale, at about a third of the revenue per door. The same product sold at three different prices across its own site and two retailers. The numbers a buyer manages to (Amazon share, household penetration, ACV and repeat) were not public, nor was any result from an earlier retail launch. Its biggest recent collaboration ran on a partner’s channels and never reached its own list.

What we told them to do.

  • PointPoint launch media at one retailer’s shelf in the week your product lands there. Measure the lift in that retailer’s velocity.
  • FundFund retail media from the trade budget, network by network. Buy search rank and new-to-brand share, and accept a lower return on ad spend in exchange for position.
  • ProtectGive the site and Amazon jobs the shelf can’t do: a subscription or a drop, reviews syndicated to every listing, one price with counts by channel.
  • ReportReport ACV, velocity, penetration and repeat. Publish a four-week read after the next launch, the way Harry’s published its Target numbers.
  • AuditCheck product claims before the media runs. The comment section follows the product onto every retailer’s review tab, and Poppi’s claim cost it $8.9 million.

What any brand can take from this.

Plan for margin pressure more than lost demand

Across five brands in three categories, retail grew the business and the online channel kept growing. The cost showed up as the retailer’s cut, trade spend and fees. Put your modeling effort there.

Give every channel a job

The site did things the shelf couldn’t: subscriptions, drops, community, founder content. A brand that gives its site a clear job stops competing with its own retailers.

Talk in the buyer’s numbers

Doors and impressions are your numbers. ACV, velocity, penetration and repeat are the buyer’s. Report in theirs, early and in public, and the next retailer has a reason to call.

What this looks like for your brand.

Try it out for free
Could Arcus build a case series for our category?

Yes. You bring the decision you are facing, such as a retail move, a new market or a new format. We choose the brands that already made that move and left a public trail, source every number into a ledger, and send a few slides with the answer on top, the evidence, and the moves for your plan. The source ledger comes with it.

Can it include our own numbers?

Yes, and that is where it gets sharper. Your own sales by channel, your retail data and your agency reports can sit next to the public cases, so the gaps are specific to you.

What does it cost?

Trying it is free: pick a question, and we answer it and walk you through it in 30 minutes. If you want everything connected after that, we scope the setup and the monthly work for your brand and quote it once you’ve seen your free answer. Then a case series like this is one more question you can ask.

The numbers behind it

Five brands, ten slides, a 157-source ledger and 14 source slides showing the page behind each number.

Sources: Company filings and interviews, Trade press, Retailer media networks, Marketplace listings

Market report
157

sources behind ten slides. Every number links to its page

0 of 5brands saw retail eat their online demand. The share shifted; four online businesses grew, and one handed online to Amazon and retail on purpose
13.9%lift in online sales near a new retail location for direct-to-consumer brands (industry research)
5moves for the media plan, each traced to the cases

How we checked, and what this doesn’t prove

Every number traces to a source in a 157-source ledger, and 14 source slides show the page behind each one.

  • Five brands, chosen because they made the move and left a public trail. Brands that tried retail and struggled leave fewer records, so this series can’t show how often the move fails.
  • Some figures are vendor-reported, like the 824% retail media result, and the halo figures are industry-level research. They are directional for any one brand.
  • Public data only for the five. Margin, repeat and penetration are rarely published, so some cases are thinner on the buyer’s numbers than others.
  • The cases show what happened alongside each brand’s retail move. They don’t prove the media caused the result. For your own launch, a regions-on, regions-off test can.

Names of the brand, its campaigns and its titles are removed. The numbers are exactly as delivered.

Download this report as a PDF

Questions people ask

More in the full FAQ, or ask us on a call.

Does retail cannibalize direct-to-consumer sales?

At the five brands studied here, no. The share of sales shifted to retail and the online business kept growing. The real cost was margin: the retailer’s cut, trade spend, slotting fees and deductions.

What is the halo effect of opening a store?

Industry research from ICSC found a store opening lifts online sales in its trade area by 6.9%, and by 13.9% for direct-to-consumer brands, across $848 billion of transactions.

What metrics do retail buyers care about?

Four: ACV (how much of the retailer’s volume carries your product), units per store per week against the category, household penetration and repeat rate.

How should a brand use retail media networks?

In these cases brands bought retail media for position: rank in the retailer’s search results and new-to-brand share, often accepting a lower return on ad spend. The attributed sales show up in the buyer’s velocity dashboard.

What is a case series?

A set of comparable stories about brands that faced the same decision, with every number sourced. It turns “what usually happens” into evidence you can check.

More real answers

Your questionis next.

Pick the question you’re least sure about. We answer it with your own numbers and what people say online, then walk you through it in 30 minutes. Free, no card. Once everything is connected, answers like this one keep coming.